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This paper provides a descriptive decision model that is based on a 
single behavioral pattern: human beings strive for consistency 
between what they do, what they think and what they perceive. This 
pattern manifests in the decision maker’s aim to bring his attitudes, 
beliefs and behavior into balance. 
Drawing principally on the theory of cognitive dissonance by 
Festinger (1957), the model shows how the concept of attitudes and 
the concept of preferences are interwoven by the human need for 
consistency. It closes the conceptual gap between preferences and 
attitudes. 
The model is an alternative approach to additive utility models, such 
as the one by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Models of this class are not 
capable of explaining behavioral discontinuities in the mini 
ultimatum game. In contrast, the attitude-based model covers this 
behavioral pattern. 
* Schmitt: University of Kaiserslautern, Department of Business Studies and Economics, Postfach 3049, 67663 
Kaiserslautern, Germany (e-mail: rschmitt@wiwi.uni-kl.de). I thank Jan Wenzelburger and Karola Welch for helpful 
comments.  
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I. Motivation  
Human decision making is studied in many different disciplines. Each discipline 
has its own focus. Economics and Psychology have independently developed 
models of decision making with distinct foci and different core concepts. 
Consequently, their views on how people value things differ.  
The core concept in economic theory is a given preference order. Economic 
theory focusses on the assumptions which are necessary to represent a given 
preference order by a utility function. It excludes the notion that preference orders 
are formed, may change, and are influenced by the social environment, e.g., by 
norms and values.  
Psychology focuses on the cognitive aspects of the entire decision process and 
supplies conceptual tools which can be used to illuminate the process of preference 
order formation. Such a conceptual tool is the attitude. An attitude is a summary 
evaluation of a psychological object on a scale (Petty et al, 1997, 611). That is, the 
evaluation is expressed in so-called attribute dimensions as good-bad, harmful-
beneficial, and favorable-unfavorable (Ajzen, 2001, 28). Psychological objects are 
mental representations of anything a decision maker can sense or imagine 
(Kahneman et al, 1999, 206). From a psychological perspective, decision makers 
are not endowed with a given preference order over the outcomes of their 
alternative behaviors, but with various attitudes towards all elements of the decision 
situation, including characteristics of other decision makers.   
Attitudes can be classified among concepts of psychology and testable 
propositions which have been incorporated into economic theory like mental 
accounting and loss aversion (Kahneman et al, 1999, 204). Yet, attitudes have not 
been fully integrated into economics. There is a conceptual gap between the concept 
of a preference and the concept of an attitude. The reason for this is that a preference 
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order is defined within the space of alternatives, while attitudes are related to the 
different attributes of alternatives. Moreover, in situations of social interaction, 
attitudes are also related to attributes of other decision makers, social norms, and 
rules.  
Bridging this gap contributes to the theoretical integration among social sciences. 
A decision model which is based on attitudes, rather than preferences, can 
contribute to this aim and provides a foundation for behavioral patterns shown by 
participants in laboratory experiments, which cannot be captured fully by utility 
theory’s current paradigms.  
One of these patterns is the framing effect. It refers to the phenomenon of 
preference reversion due to different descriptions of the decision problem 
(Takemura, 2014, 103). We argue that framing can change the mental perception 
of any decision situation. As a result of this, the set of psychological objects, which 
the decision maker regards as relevant, changes too. As attitudes refer to 
psychological objects, the set of relevant attitudes and maybe their strengths are 
changed, as well. Therefore a decision theory which is based on attitudes 
incorporates framing effects. 
Another behavioral pattern is fairness behavior. Although there are plenty of 
models which can be calibrated to fit the data of laboratory experiments, they lack 
a psychological foundation, while a unifying framework for these models still does 
not exist. Hence this class of models is open to further criticism. 
Current descriptive fairness models, like the one by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), use 
additive separable utility functions for the representation of the agent’s preference 
order. This class of fairness models has been invented as an alternative to the model 
of Homo Economicus. The model of Homo Economicus has been criticized, not 
only because of its methodological individualism, but also because of its reliance 
on the axioms of rationality, which are not fulfilled in reality. Now, the crucial point 
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is: additive separability of utility functions requires the fulfillment of both the 
axioms of rationality, and of some additional axioms. This has been shown by 
Fishburn (1992). Hence it can be argued that additive separable utility functions are 
not very suitable to serve as an alternative to the model of Homo Economicus. 
This paper offers an alternative model of human choice behavior which is based 
on a single basic behavioral pattern identified by Leon Festinger (1957). It is the 
striving for consistency between what you do, what you think and what you 
perceive. The idea, that human behavior is a result of the striving for cognitive 
consistency is the core element of Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance. 
This theory relies heavily on the concept of attitude and is empirically very well 
verified (Harmon-Jones et al, 2007, 13). This makes it suitable to serve as a base 
for a decision model which closes the gap between preferences and attitudes.  
The model is based on the original theory of cognitive dissonance by Festinger 
(1957), and on the action - based model of cognitive dissonance by Harmon-Jones 
et al. (2007, 2009, and 2012). It shows that the concept of attitudes and the concept 
of preferences are interwoven by the human need for consistency and inner 
harmony. As we will see, this model can cope with the framing effect and 
behavioral discontinuities.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section provides a 
short discussion on the related economic literature. Section 3 works out the relevant 
elements of the theory of cognitive dissonance which can be adapted to our decision 
model. These provide some basic concepts for the model, which fuse into the 
model’s core concept: individuals who seek to minimize cognitive dissonance 
choose an alternative by finding a suitable compromise. A mathematical 
formulation is carried out in section 3. In section 4 we use the model to explain 
behavioral discontinuities in the mini ultimatum game. Section 5 comes to an 
overall conclusion. 
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II. Related Literature  
There are some approaches that already incorporate single aspects of the theory 
of cognitive dissonance into economic models. Akerlof and Dickens (1982) and 
Rabin (1994) focus only on aspects of dissonance theory which influence belief 
formation. Epstein and Kopylov (2005) focus on the post - decision process, which 
is self-justification on past decisions through changing beliefs. Konow (2000) and 
Oxoby (2003) relate cognitive dissonance to preferences, but only by adding a 
dissonance parameter into an additive utility function. We have already outlined 
the problems which come with additive utility functions.  
As noted before, we will apply our model to the mini ultimatum game. In the 
literature on fairness behavior we find hints concerning the attitudes which are 
relevant in this game. Although not explicitly mentioned, these models take 
attitudes into consideration. Indeed, models of distributive fairness, like Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999), Ottone and Ponzano (2005) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) rely 
on attitudes which are directed towards one’s own monetary payoff, and the 
differences in players’ monetary outcomes. Other attitudes can be found in 
interactional fairness models and in procedural fairness models, such as positive 
attitudes towards a social welfare function (Charness and Rabin (2000)), attitudes 
towards opponents’ outcomes (Levine (1997)), and attitudes towards the perceived 
intentions of the opponent (Rabin (1993); Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2000)). We 
will refer to this when explaining behavioral discontinuities in section 4. Next, we 
derive the basic principles of our model.  
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III. Basic Premises and the Model’s Core Concept  
A. Shaping the theory of cognitive dissonance 
In this section, dissonance theory is formulated in such a way that it can be 
converted into a decision model. We introduce suitable definitions of the theory’s 
core elements and derive our model’s basic assumptions. Aspects of dissonance 
theory which are related to ex-post-decision processes, like rationalizing of chosen 
behaviors, are omitted. 
Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance states that when a decision 
process takes place and after the chosen behavior has been carried out, 
inconsistencies between cognitive elements and one’s behavior can occur. 
Inconsistencies cause cognitive dissonance. Two cognitive elements are dissonant 
if they do not fit together (Festinger 1957, 12). If people suffer cognitive dissonance 
they feel pressure to reduce or eliminate it (Festinger, 1957, 18).  
Festinger mentions five different cognitive elements: beliefs, knowledge, 
attitudes, opinions and values. He does not, however, provide any definitions of 
these terms. This makes dissonance theory somewhat fuzzy.  
The mathematical formulation of our decision model demands precise, and thus 
quite narrow definitions of the different cognitive elements. We provide definitions 
which are in line with the standard concepts in social psychology. 
 
Defining Knowledge and Belief 
We define “belief” similarly to the standard concept in game theory, but do not 
refer to strategies only – other components of decision situations are also included.  
We define the decision maker’s knowledge and belief in relation to single 
components: knowledge is perfect information on the nature of a component. 
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Imperfect information on a component results in a belief as to its nature. A belief 
is a probability distribution comprising the possible natures of this component.  
 
Defining Attitude 
In section I, we have defined an attitude as a summary evaluation of a 
psychological object on a scale, and a psychological object as a mental 
representation of a thing or of an idea. 
Psychological objects can be very concrete such as a person’s hair color, or more 
abstract such as the idea of sustainability (Petty et al. 2003, 353). In a game theory 
laboratory experiment, psychological objects may be monetary payoffs, the game 
structure, or norms which are intertwined with the game structure or with the 
framing of the experiment. In a decision situation of social interaction, the relevant 
set of psychological objects is influenced by the situational context. For example, 
group affiliation can activate two different norms concerning cooperation in the 
prisoner’s dilemma game. If the other player is a member of an enemy army, the 
norm not to cooperate with the enemy is activated. If the other player is affiliated 
to a federate army, then the norm to cooperate is activated.  
We assume that for any specific decision situation, the set of psychological 
objects is finite and discrete. We denote this set with 𝒪𝒪, so that: 𝒪𝒪 = {1, … , 𝑗𝑗, … , 𝐽𝐽}. 
Each psychological object 𝑗𝑗  has characteristic values. The set of characteristic 
values of psychological object 𝑗𝑗 is denoted with 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗. It is either finite and discrete or 
a closed interval in ℝ. Each alternative 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆 is characterized by its specific values 
of the 𝐽𝐽  objects. Or, seen from another perspective, we can say that the 
characteristic value of a psychological object is determined by the choice of the 
alternative 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆. Hence, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗(𝑠𝑠) ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 and 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗: 𝑆𝑆 → 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗, 𝑠𝑠 ↦ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗(𝑠𝑠).  
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The evaluation of psychological objects is subjective (Olson and Maio, 2003, 
299).  Attitudes can be weak or strong. Given the vast number of definitions on 
attitude strength, we follow the definition by Miller and Peterson. “Attitude strength 
is defined as the extent to which an attitude is stable, resistant to change, impacts 
information processing, and guides behavior” (Miller and Peterson, 2004, 847).  
As our focus is on decision making for given attitudes and beliefs, we can omit 
the fact that attitudes can change and that they influence the process of information 
gathering and belief formation. This enables us to simplify the concept “attitude 
strength”. We define attitude strength as the extent to which the related attitude 
guides an agent’s behavior. The strength of attitude j is represented by parameter 
𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗  𝜖𝜖 [0,1]. 
We introduce the expression “neutral attitude” for objects which the decision 
maker considers to be irrelevant in a specific decision situation and for attitudes 
which currently do not have any strength. Finally, we define an attitude as a 
negative, neutral or positive relation to a psychological object j. In the following, 
an attitude is represented as a combination of a function which represents the 
attitude’s valence, and a parameter which represents the attitude strength. 
Definition: Attitude 
The attitude on object 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝒪𝒪  is represented by �𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ,𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗�, where 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗:𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 → 𝑉𝑉, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 ⟼
𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� is the valence function, and 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗  𝜖𝜖 [0,1] is the parameter of attitude strength. 
The codomain V depends on the attitude valence. If the attitude on object j is 
positive, then 𝑉𝑉 ⊑ ℝ+. If it is neutral, then 𝑉𝑉 = {0} and if it is negative, then 𝑉𝑉 ⊑
𝑅𝑅−. 
Those psychological objects towards which the decision maker has a neutral 
attitude do not play any role in determining his decision. Hence, only psychological 
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objects towards which the decision maker holds a negative or positive attitude 
become decision criteria. That is, all decision criteria are psychological objects, but 
not all psychological objects are decision criteria. 
We assume that, given a single attitude, the decision maker ceteris paribus seeks 
to behave in accordance with this single attitude. This assumption manifests in the 
following property of the valence function: the number, which it assigns to a 
characteristic value of a psychological object, is the greater the more the 
characteristic value is compatible to the underlying (non-neutral) attitude. This 
assumption implies that the decision maker, ceteris paribus, seeks to maximize the 
valence function 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 over the set of alternatives.  
Hitherto, we have defined “believe” and “attitude,” and have argued why 
knowledge can be subsumed under the concept of belief. Next, we argue why values 
are attitudes and why we can also subsume opinions under the concept of belief.  
Value and Opinion  
Concerning the relation between a value and an attitude, we need to differentiate 
whether a value is held on an individual level or on a societal level. Values, which 
are held by the society, are institutional in nature. Like norms and rules, which are 
also institutional, these values can become the object of a decision maker’s attitude. 
If the attitude is positive and the attitude’s valence is very strong, this societal value 
becomes an individual value. An individual value is an attitude with high 
importance, so that it becomes a guiding principle in life. Such attitudes are more 
resistant to change than other attitudes. An opinion is a nexus between a 
psychological object and an attribute which is non-judgmental. This means 
opinions do not include any positive or negative attributions and hence do not 
evaluate the object. Thus, an opinion essentially differs from an attitude in that it 
does not involve any value judgement. For example, the opinion, “Berlin is a 
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cultural city” does not include a negative or positive attribution. Opinions are 
closely related to beliefs. For convenience, we will not differentiate between 
opinions and beliefs, but interpret opinions as beliefs.  
Reducing the Cognitive Elements in Dissonance Theory 
Based on the considerations just made, we can reduce the number of cognitive 
elements which were mentioned in Festinger’s theory from five to two, namely 
attitudes and beliefs. Hence, we build our decision model on these two different 
kinds of cognitive elements. 
In the following section we assume that in the moment of decision the decision 
maker’s attitudes and beliefs are given.  
 
B. Solving Dissonance Theory’s Measurement Difficulties 
Festinger states that his theory has some serious measurement difficulties, due to 
the conceptual definitions of dissonance and consonance (Festinger, 1957, 15). 
Nevertheless, he specifies the crucial factor which influences the magnitude of 
dissonance. It is the importance of the cognitive elements which are involved in the 
specific relation. He states that the magnitude of the dissonance increases with the 
importance of the involved cognitive elements (Festinger, 1957, 18), and 
emphasizes that the total magnitude of dissonance is determined by the weighted 
proportion of all relevant relations (Festinger, 1957, 262). Concerning the concept 
of attitude, we can identify the attitude strength as a measurement of its importance. 
Festinger does not address the issue of how to measure dissonance. As cognitive 
dissonance can have many different sources like logical inconsistencies, cultural 
mores, past experience or specific opinions (Festinger, 1957, p. 14), neither the 
units nor the scale of dissonance are obvious. The action-based model of 
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dissonance, a recent interpretation of the theory of cognitive dissonance (by 
Harmon-Jones et al. 2009, 128), gives a hint as to how to measure dissonance. This 
hint is given by the answer to the question, “what exactly causes dissonance?” 
Harmon-Jones identifies inconsistencies between important action tendencies as 
the cause for dissonance (Harmon-Jones, 2012, 546). An action tendency is a 
motivational mental state. It is considered as the desire to carry out a specific action. 
(Reisenzein, 2014, 1). Here, in the context of dissonance theory, an action tendency 
is related to a specific attitude. If there is a single alternative which fits best to the 
related attitude, then this alternative and the action tendency are congruent. But 
often several different alternatives fit equally well with the related attitude. Then, 
the decision maker has the desire to carry out each of these alternatives. This 
unfeasible desire describes the mental state of indecisiveness.  
Next, we conceptualize action tendencies. Representing alternatives as unit 
vectors allows for an uncomplicated conceptualization. 
If the set of alternatives is finite and discrete, so that 𝑆𝑆 = {𝑠𝑠1, 𝑠𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚}, then: 
𝑠𝑠1 = (1,0,0, … ,0) , 𝑠𝑠2 = (0,1,0, … ,0) , … , 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 = (0,0,0, … ,1) . If the set of 
alternatives a closed interval in ℝ, we can normalize, so that 𝑆𝑆 = [0,1]. Since we 
can represent the upper bound as a unit vector in the one-dimensional space, an 
alternative 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆 serves as a convex combination of the unit vector and the zero 
vector. Note, that in the case of discrete alternatives convex combinations of the 
unit vectors are not feasible.   
In the following, we denote the set of valence maximization alternatives of the 
attitude to object j  with ?̂?𝑆𝑗𝑗 . It is defined as follows: ?̂?𝑆𝑗𝑗 = �𝑠𝑠 ∈
𝑆𝑆 � 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗(𝑠𝑠)�  𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚�. We can represent an action tendency as a convex 
combination of all favored alternatives, whereas they are weighted equally. We 
normalize the weights so that they add up to 1.   
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Definition: Action Tendency  
Let the number of elements in ?̂?𝑆𝑗𝑗 = �𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆 � 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗(𝑠𝑠)�  𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚  �  be 𝑛𝑛, i.e.  
?̂?𝑆𝑗𝑗 = {𝑠𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖, … , 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛  }. The action tendency ?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗  which has been generated by the 
attitude to object 𝑗𝑗 is the convex combination of the 𝑛𝑛 different attitude maximizing 
alternatives: ?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗 = 1𝑛𝑛∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 . 
In the following Δ denotes set of action tendencies. For each of the J different 
objects the related attitudes generate action tendencies. There results a set of action 
tendencies, ?̂?𝑆 = �?̂?𝑠1, ?̂?𝑠2, … , ?̂?𝑠𝐽𝐽�.   
Now, we can link to the core proposition of the action - based model and give a 
solution to the measurement problem. The action - based model states that cognitive 
elements can activate action tendencies which, in turn, are cognitive elements and 
that “inconsistency between [cognitive elements] makes persons uncomfortable 
because inconsistency has the potential to interfere with effective action” (Harmon-
Jones, 2012, 546). Cognitive elements, which imply different and thus inconsistent 
action tendencies cause dissonance. This means, dissonance occurs whenever it is 
not possible to carry out an alternative which is in line with each of the inconsistent 
cognitive elements that are very important in regard to the specific decision 
situation (Harmon-Jones, 2012, 546).  
Applying this argument to our interpretation of dissonance theory uncovers two 
sources of dissonance. One results from the differences of distinct action tendencies 
and the second from the difference between action tendencies and alternatives. The 
last source is only relevant if S is discrete. 
This means that dissonance occurs if either there is at least one s�j that is not a unit 
vector and S is discrete, or S�  contains at least two different action tendencies, 
13 
 
because in these cases the decision maker has a wish to carry out different 
alternatives at the same time – which is impossible.  
In the following section we measure the amount of imposed dissonance between 
any pair of action tendencies by the square of their Euclidian distance. Hence, we 
define the overall amount of cognitive dissonance 𝐷𝐷 which has been imposed by 𝐽𝐽 
different attitudes: 
Definition: Overall Amount of Cognitive Dissonance  
The overall amount of cognitive dissonance D, which has been imposed on a 
decision maker whose decision making is guided by 𝐽𝐽  different attitudes, is 
measured as follows: 𝐷𝐷 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ ��?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗 − 𝜎𝜎�2�2𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 .  
In the next section we derive the model’s core concept. 
 
C. The Model’s Core Concept: The Compromise 
We derive the model’s core concept by isolating the methods mentioned by 
Festinger (1957), with which a decision maker seeks to reduce cognitive 
dissonance.  
Festinger states that cognitive dissonance is a motivating factor because its 
existence is psychologically uncomfortable, so that people seek to reduce it and 
avoid situations and information which might contribute towards an increase of 
dissonance (Festinger, 1957, 3). Three methods of reducing dissonance are 
specified: “changing one or more of the elements involved in dissonant relations 
[...] adding new cognitive elements that are consonant with already existing 
cognition [… and] decreasing the importance of the elements involved in the 
dissonant relations” (Festinger, 1957, 264).  
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Changing the behavioral cognitive element can be performed by taking a specific 
action which better suits the environmental cognitive element than any other action. 
Hence, this method of reducing dissonance is a way to make a decision. Therefore, 
this aspect of dissonance theory can serve as a core assumption of our model.  
Cognitive elements are resistant to change, which implies that changing cognitive 
elements causes psychological cost. There are different sources of resistance, 
namely the responsiveness to reality, the extent of pain or loss which is inherent in 
the change, the degree of satisfaction obtained from present behavior and the 
relationships of all other elements with the element which is considered to be 
changed (Festinger, 1957, 24f) That is, changing one element in order to eliminate 
some dissonance “may create a whole host of new ones” (Festinger, 1957, 19).  
Here, the responsiveness to reality is a very important point. It indicates that 
changing beliefs tendentially is done in accordance with (perceived) reality. 
Therefore, changing beliefs is, to a vast extent, similar to a learning process. But 
note: we have assumed that the decision maker’s attitudes and beliefs are given. 
From this, it follows that in the pre-decision stage, cognitive dissonance is changed 
by adapting behavior to given beliefs and attitudes. Changing beliefs and attitudes 
is part of the post-decision process, except the decision maker would stay undecided 
without any change of these cognitive elements. Hence, for given beliefs, the 
decision maker needs to find an alternative which reduces the overall amount of 
cognitive dissonance which has been imposed by competing attitudes respectively 
by the related action tendencies. 
The action-based model refers to this by proposing two different motivations for 
reducing dissonance: a proximal motivation and a distal motivation. The term 
“proximal motivation” refers to the negative emotion of dissonance and “distal 
motivation” refers to the decision maker’s need for a non-conflicted action. 
(Harmon-Jones et al, 2009, 128).  
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Both motivations induce the wish to carry out an alternative which balances the 
decision maker‘s attitudes by minimizing the amount of cognitive dissonance. The 
action tendency which minimizes the amount of cognitive dissonance is called 
“dissonance minimizing action tendency” and is denoted with 𝜎𝜎∗.  
The decision maker chooses the alternative which imposes the least amount of 
additional cognitive dissonance on him in comparison to his dissonance minimizing 
action tendency.   
Due to our measurement of cognitive dissonance, we specify 𝜎𝜎∗ as the action 
tendency which minimizes the weighted sum of the distances between itself and 
each of the competing action tendencies. Thereby, each dissonant relation between 
an action tendency and the dissonance minimizing action tendency is weighted with 
the parameter which represents the strength of the underlying attitude. In the 
following, we normalize the weights, so that ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 = 1𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 .   
Definition: Dissonance Minimizing Action Tendency 
Let ‖ ‖2  denote the Euclidian distance. The dissonance minimizing action 
tendency is defined by 𝜎𝜎∗ = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝜎𝜎∈∆
∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ ��?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗 − 𝜎𝜎�2�
2𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1  
By using weights, we assume that reducing the dissonance, which has been 
caused by a strong attitude, is more important to the decision maker than reducing 
the dissonance which has been caused by a weak attitude. 
Usually, the dissonance minimizing action tendency turns out to be a convex 
combination of the alternatives. This dissonance minimizing action tendency is 
what the decision maker actually desires to do. σ∗ brings the different and thus 
competing attitudes into balance. It is a mental equilibrium in form of a cognitive 
compromise between the divergent action tendencies ?̂?𝑠1, ?̂?𝑠2, … , ?̂?𝑠𝐽𝐽.  
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Only if all cognitive elements lead to the same action tendency, will the 
dissonance minimizing action tendency be congruent to an action. But usually 𝜎𝜎∗ 
is not feasible as it usually entails tendencies towards different alternatives. In other 
words it entails the desire to carry out different alternatives at the same time.  
Hence a compromise between desire and reality is necessary for making a 
decision. It is choosing the alternative 𝑠𝑠∗  which imposes as little additional 
inconsistency as possible on the decision maker. We call 𝑠𝑠∗  the “dissonance 
minimizing alternative.” If the desire is realizable, then 𝜎𝜎∗ = 𝑠𝑠∗. 
Definition: Dissonance Minimizing Alternative 
The dissonance minimizing alternative is defined by 𝑠𝑠∗ = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑠𝑠∈𝑆𝑆
‖𝜎𝜎∗ − 𝑠𝑠‖2. 
We summarize the process of decision making by the following core 
assumptions: First, attitudes lead to action tendencies. Second, competing attitudes 
can lead to competing action tendencies. Third, individuals seek to minimize the 
amount of cognitive dissonance by choosing an alternative which is closest to the 
dissonance minimizing action tendency. 
In the next section we provide the compact mathematical description of our 
model. 
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IV. Resume: The Cognitive Decision Model 
Here, we provide a resume in the form of a compact mathematical description of 
the decision model. 
Let 𝒪𝒪  denote the set of psychological objects and Xj  the set of characteristic 
values, which is bounded above and below. S is the set of alternatives, and Δ is the 
set of action tendencies. 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆, 𝜎𝜎 𝜖𝜖 𝛥𝛥 and 𝑆𝑆 ⊂ Δ. If S is discrete and 𝑆𝑆 = {1, … ,𝑚𝑚}, 
then Δ is the 1-m dimensional unit simplex and S is the set of its vertices. Let ‖ ‖2 
denote the Euclidian distance. 
The characteristic value of a psychological object is a function:  
(1) 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗: 𝑆𝑆 → 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗, 𝑠𝑠 ↦ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗(𝑠𝑠).  
A decision maker is endowed with 𝐽𝐽 different attitudes �𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ,𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗�𝑗𝑗=1,…,𝐽𝐽, where 
 (2)  𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗:𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 → 𝑉𝑉 , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 ↦ 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗�  
represents the attitude’s valence and 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗  𝜖𝜖 [0,1] represents the attitude strength. 𝑉𝑉 ⊑
ℝ+  if the attitude is positive. 𝑉𝑉 = {0}  if the attitude is neutral. 𝑉𝑉 ⊑ ℝ−  if the 
attitude is negative. 
We normalize the attitude strengths, such that: 
(3)   ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 = 1𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 .  
The decision problem can be formulated as a problem of maximizing 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽 
different objective functions 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗(𝑠𝑠)� over argument s.  
From the theory of cognitive dissonance, we have derived the idea that the 
solution concept of this decision problem is similar to compromise programming. 
Dissonance theory states that the solution is found within the following two mental 
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steps. In the first step the decision maker’s action tendency is determined. In the 
second step a feasible alternative is determined. 
First step: Every single objective function is maximized. This results in a solution 
set for each attitude: 
(4) ?̂?𝑆𝑗𝑗 = �𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆 � 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗(𝑠𝑠)�  𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚  � 
We gave this set a psychological interpretation: The decision maker has the same 
mental motivation to carry out any of the alternatives in the solution set ?̂?𝑆𝑗𝑗 ={𝑠𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖, … , 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛  }. This leads to the action tendency:  
(5) ?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗 = 1𝑛𝑛 ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 . 
The 𝐽𝐽 objective functions lead to the set of action tendencies: 
(6) ?̂?𝑆 = �?̂?𝑠1, ?̂?𝑠2, … , ?̂?𝑠𝐽𝐽� 
These different, and thus competing, action tendencies impose cognitive 
dissonance on the decision maker which we measure with: 
(7) 𝐷𝐷 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ ��?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗 − 𝜎𝜎�2�2𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1  
Dissonance is minimized by 𝜎𝜎∗ which is defined as: 
(8) 𝜎𝜎∗ = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝜎𝜎∈∆
∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ ��?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗 − 𝜎𝜎�2�
2𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1  
Proposition 1: 
𝜎𝜎∗ is a convex combination of the action tendencies ?̂?𝑠1, … , ?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗 , … , ?̂?𝑠𝐽𝐽. More precisely 
𝜎𝜎∗ = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ ?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 .  
Proof of Proposition: see Appendix. 
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Second step: The dissonance minimizing alternative is determined. The 
dissonance minimizing alternative 𝑠𝑠∗  is the alternative whose unit vector has 
minimal distance to the dissonance minimizing action tendency 𝜎𝜎∗:  
(9) 𝑠𝑠∗ = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑠𝑠∈𝑆𝑆
‖𝜎𝜎∗ − 𝑠𝑠‖2 
Let the set of alternatives be continuous. Then, obviously 𝑠𝑠∗ = 𝜎𝜎∗. Let the set of 
alternatives be discrete and the k-th component of σ∗ be the largest component. We 
distinguish two cases.  
Case 1: All other components are smaller than the k-th component.   
Case 2: There is at least one other component which has the same magnitude as 
the k-th component.  
In case 1  s∗ is the alternative which is represented by the k-th unit vector. Hence, 
it follows: 𝑠𝑠∗ = 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘. In case 2, at least two unit vectors have the same (minimum) 
distance to 𝜎𝜎∗. Hence, the decision maker is indifferent between these alternatives 
and favors each of them equally. He is undecided. As long as the decision maker 
stays in the mental state of undecidedness, he cannot carry out any alternative. The 
decision maker will engage in psychological effort to get rid of this indifference. 
This might involve searching for new information or changing the strengths of the 
less important attitudes. As we have assumed that beliefs and attitudes are given, 
the mechanisms with regard to attitude change and belief change are beyond the 
scope of this model.   
Of major interest here is the notion that the components of the vector 𝜎𝜎∗, which 
represents the dissonance minimizing action tendency, yield a preference order over 
the alternatives. If 𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘∗ > 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙∗  then the decision maker prefers alternative 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘  over 
alternative 𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙 and if 𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘∗ = 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙∗ then they are indifferent between alternative 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘 and 
𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙. The preference rank of each alternative is given by its distance to the dissonance 
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minimizing action tendency 𝜎𝜎∗. Hence attitudes are the foundation of preference 
orders.  
Up to now, we have not clarified how constraints are incorporated into the 
psychological model. Clearly a constraint, like a budget constraint, can shift the 
decision maker’s focus to certain psychological objects and related attitudes. A 
decision maker’s awareness of a budget constraint might shift his focus to 
pecuniary objects or norms which are related to austerity. So, in contrast to 
normative decision models, constraints do not only influence the set of feasible 
alternatives, but also the set of decision criteria. But this does not change anything 
of our mathematical representation. Neither does the constraint affect the second 
step, as this step determines the decision maker’s preference order. Hence, the 
decision maker will take the alternative which is highest in rank and not excluded 
by constraints.     
The human need for “internal harmony, consistency, or congruity among his 
opinions, attitudes, knowledge, and values” (Festinger, 1957, 260) makes humans 
strive for the ideal cognitive compromise. This ideal compromise balances the 
divergent attitudes.  Reality forces people to choose an alternative which differs 
from this cognitive compromise. The desirability of the alternatives is given by 
their distance to the cognitive compromise. A preference order is defined. The most 
preferred alternative is not what the decision maker desires most. It is only the best 
compromise between wish and reality.  
In the next section we apply our model to the ultimatum game in order to explain 
behavioral discontinuities in mini ultimatum games. A behavioral discontinuity 
means that small payoff changes can reverse the behavior of decision makers (Güth, 
Huck and Müller, 1998, 5). 
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V. Discussion 
Our model is an alternative approach to the class of additive utility models which 
were invented to explain prosocial behavior, such as the model by Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999).  
In contrast to these models which cannot cope with the framing effect, as they 
are context free (Binmore and Shaked, 2010, 91), our model captures this effect by 
the vector of attitude strengths. In our model, attitude strengths are influenced by 
framing. Some attitudes are neutral in one situation but not neutral in another 
situation.  
Our idea of attitudes being triggered and attitude strength being changed by the 
framing process is in line with the idea of Binmore and Shaked (2010, 88), who 
state that social norms are triggered by the framing of the laboratory game. 
Likewise, our idea is consistent with the contingent focus model by Takemura 
(1994), which states that framing effects emerge, not due to a shift of the reference 
point, but due to a change of the decision makers’ foci on the decision situation 
(Takemura, 2014, 118).  
Although most of the models of the class of additive utility models are based on 
experimental evidence on the ultimatum game, without further ado they are not 
capable of explaining behavioral discontinuities in the mini ultimatum game. In 
contrast, our model covers this behavioral pattern, which we show in the following. 
We focus on proposer behavior only.  
Our decision model allows for factoring in different attitudes at the same time. 
Therefore it is important to think which of the vast amount of possible attitudes are 
most relevant in specified decision situations. The easiest way to find out decision 
makers sets of relevant attitudes is asking them directly. Here we point to further 
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research. Meanwhile let us consider the experimental evidence on fairness 
behavior.   
As most games were played in an anonymous setting, the set of known attitudes 
is not very large. In the relevant literature we find attitudes towards the material 
payoff of the decision maker, material payoffs of the other decision makers (Levine, 
1997), payoff-inequity (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), 
payoff efficiency and loss aversion (Engel and Zhurakhovska, 2013) and the norm 
of reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Falk and Fischbacher, 2000). Other social norms such 
as “you shall share”, “do not exploit others” or “do not let yourself be exploited” 
can influence decisions, too.  
The most prominent model, the Fehr-Schmidt model, omits social norms and 
explains fairness behavior only with “inequity aversion.” Inequity aversion predicts 
behavior in the ultimatum game, but not in the dictator game. (Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999, 848).  If we look carefully at the Fehr-Schmidt model we can find, that their 
concept of inequity aversion relies only on two different attitudes: a negative 
attitude towards advantageous inequity and a negative attitude towards 
disadvantageous inequity. The latter attitude is similar to envy; the former is similar 
to compassion.  
Another attitude is presented by Kirchsteiger (1994), who argues that the 
empirical results of behavior in the ultimatum game can be explained by the 
proposers’ fear that their offer might be rejected by an envious responder. We can 
translate the proposer’s fear into the negative attitude against one’s offer being 
refuted with the consequence of receiving nothing in the end.  
People can also have positive attitudes towards “advantageous inequity.” This 
attitude corresponds to spitefulness. Spitefulness has been considered to contribute 
to fairness behavior for example in the model by Levine (1997). Levine based his 
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model on a second attitude, namely altruism. The attitude altruism is a positive 
attitude towards the payoff of someone else.        
Another explanation for behavioral patterns in ultimatum and dictator games is 
the influence of norms of fair sharing.  Experiments on the sharing behavior of 
young children support an explanation by fairness norms rather than by inequity 
aversion, because young children at the age of 3-6 years are willing to accept 
advantageous inequity (McAuliffe, Blake, Warneken, 2015, 1), but refute 
disadvantageous offers. The aversion to disadvantageous outcomes is observed in 
decisions of children at the age of 4. (McAuliffe, Blake, Warneken, 2015, 1) 
Showing concern for disadvantageous inequity can be caused by psychological 
spitefulness. At the age of 4, children behave spitefully. That is, they are willing to 
sacrifice a small pay-off to prevent [others] from receiving more” (McAuliffe, 
Blake and Warneken, 2015, 2). The co-occurence of accepting advantageous offers 
and refuting disadvantageous offers cannot be explained by a general desire to 
reduce inequality (McAuliffe, Blake and Warneken, 2015, 4).  
Children at the age of 3 - 6 are aware of the validity of sharing norms (Smith, 
Blake and Harris 2013, 9). They apply the norm to themselves and to others, but do 
not follow the norm themselves (Smith, Blake and Harris, 2013, 9). Young children 
forego equal sharing although they do not expect their peers to engage in unfair 
resource distribution and do not deny the applicability of the norm of equal sharing. 
They are aware of their norm-deviant behavior (Smith, Blake, and Harris 2013, 8). 
The sharing behavior of children at the age of 8 is more in line with the norm of 
equal sharing (Smith, Blake and Harris 2013, 8). At this age, egalitarian motives in 
sharing behavior emerge too (McAuliffe, Blake and Warneken, 2015, 4). This 
indicates that sharing behavior is rather motivated by norms which are fully 
internalized at the age of about 8 and not by inequity aversion. We think that envy 
and spitefulness are overlaid by an internalized norm of sharing.  
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Fairness behavior can be induced by the interplay of all of the attitudes which we 
have found in the literature so far. It is important to note that our model does not 
require the exclusion of any attitude on an ad hoc basis. But it seems reasonable to 
assume that the positive attitude to one’s own payoff, refusal aversion and norm 
compliance play a more dominant role, whereas spitefulness, envy and altruism 
play a less important role for the proposer’s decision making. Next we analyze the 
proposer’s behavior in the ultimatum game.  
A. Proposer Behavior in the Ultimatum Game 
In the ultimatum game the proposer’s belief as to the responder’s threshold for 
acceptance 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 of an offer is a crucial factor. If the proposer’s offer 𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃 exceeds 
𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛, then the responder accepts, otherwise she refutes the offer. In the standard 
game theory setting, the proposer knows that the responder is a payoff maximizer. 
The acceptance threshold of a payoff maximizer is the smallest possible share of 
money. In reality, the proposer is aware that social norms are valid, that attitudes 
such as envy, spite and altruism guide decisions. Hence the proposer is aware that 
there is uncertainty concerning the acceptance of his offer. A belief with regard to 
the acceptance threshold is formed. Here, we formalize such a belief as a probability 
distribution over the possible shares of money. We do not discuss how such a belief 
is formed.  
Let 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 ∈ [0; 1] denote the acceptance threshold of the responder, 𝐹𝐹�(𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛) the 
cumulative distribution function and 𝑓𝑓(𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛) the density function which represent 
the proposer’s belief on smin. The proposer’s awareness on the validity of a sharing 
norm and on envy and spitefulness may lead to a belief over the responder’s action 
tendency which takes into account that higher offers are more often accepted than 
lower offers, that most people would refute very low offers and would accept offers 
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above the sharing norm. In an anonymous setting, this may lead to a density 
function which has a modal value near the sharing norm.  
The proposer’s belief with regard to the responder’s action tendency 𝑓𝑓(𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛), 
respectively 𝐹𝐹�(𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛), results in a belief as to the responder’s acceptance level ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛. 
The believed acceptance level is the smallest offer for which the distribution 
function 𝐹𝐹�(𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛) takes on the value 1.  Hence: ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝐹𝐹�(𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛) = 1� .  
Next, we represent the proposer’s different attitudes as functions which lead to 
competing action tendencies. We normalize the stake to size 1. Let 𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 =[0; 1] denote a strategy of the proposer, 𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 = {𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎} a strategy of 
the responder, and ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅 the best response of the responder. The payoff of the proposer 
is denoted by 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, 𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅) . The payoff of the responder is 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅 , 𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃) = 1 −
𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, 𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅) if they accept, and zero if they do not accept. From the viewpoint of the 
proposer the best response of the responder depends on the belief on the acceptance 
level, so that:  
(10) ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛) = �𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃 ≥ ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃 < ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 
The belief contingent action tendency ?̂?𝑠1𝑃𝑃  which is most compatible to the 
proposer’s positive attitude towards his own payoff is the maximum of the attitude 
function: 
(11) 𝑎𝑎1𝑃𝑃 = −�𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)� − ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�  
Hence: 
(12) ?̂?𝑆1𝑃𝑃 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃∈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃
�𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)� − ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�  
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It easy to see ?̂?𝑆1𝑃𝑃 = {?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛}. That is, a decision maker who only seeks to maximize 
his own payoff offers the acceptance level to the responder: ?̂?𝑠1𝑃𝑃 = ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛. The action 
tendencies which are most compatible to the proposer’s negative attitude towards 
refusal of his offer are determined by the attitude function: 
(13) 𝑎𝑎2𝑃𝑃 = −�𝐹𝐹(?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛) − 𝐹𝐹(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃)�  
As 𝐹𝐹(?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛) = 1 we can write: 
(14) 𝑎𝑎2𝑃𝑃 = −�1 − 𝐹𝐹(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃)�  
The set of attitude maximizing action tendencies is: 
(15) ?̂?𝑆2𝑃𝑃 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃∈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃
�1 − 𝐹𝐹(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃)� 
?̂?𝑆2
𝑃𝑃  entails all offers which are equal to or greater than ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 . Hence ?̂?𝑆𝑗𝑗 =[?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛; 1], that is, each element in the interval is an attitude maximizing alternative. 
According to our model, in the case in which an attitude leads to more than one 
attitude maximizing alternative, the resulting action tendency is the following 
convex combination of the n  different attitude maximizing alternatives: ?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗 =
1
𝑛𝑛
∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 . Therefore, in the case at hand it holds that: 
(16)  ?̂?𝑠2𝑃𝑃 = 11−𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ∫ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖1𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚   
Hence: 
(17)  ?̂?𝑠2𝑃𝑃 = 0.5 ∙ (1 + ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛) 
The strength of the negative attitude towards refusal is denoted with 𝛽𝛽1. We have 
already stated, that attitudes towards norms play a crucial role in human decision 
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making. In the ultimatum game, the norm of equal sharing is dominant, especially 
if the game is not played anonymously. A positive attitude towards the norm of 
equal sharing is represented by the (negative) attitude towards one’s own norm 
deviance behavior and hence by 
(18) 𝑎𝑎3𝑃𝑃 = |0.5 − 𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃|. 
We denote by ?̂?𝑠3𝑃𝑃 the proposer‘s action tendency which is most norm compliant. 
As we have normalized the game stake to size 1, ?̂?𝑆3𝑃𝑃 is determined by: 
(19) 𝑆𝑆3𝑃𝑃 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃∈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃
|0.5 − 𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃|  
?̂?𝑆3
𝑃𝑃 = {0.5}. Hence: ?̂?𝑠3𝑃𝑃 = 0.5. That is, a decision maker who only seeks for norm 
compliance only offers half of the stakes to the responder. The attitude strength of 
the attitude toward the norm of equal sharing is denoted by 𝛽𝛽3. Spitefulness, the 
positive attitude towards advantageous inequity, is an attitude which seeks to avoid 
equal outcomes and outcomes in which the responder earns more. Spitefulness is 
represented by the constraint  
(20) 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)� ≥  𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)�  
and the function 
(21) 𝑎𝑎4𝑃𝑃 =  𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)� − 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)�.  
Its attitude strength is 𝛽𝛽4. This leads to the following set of attitude maximizing 
action tendencies: 
(22) ?̂?𝑆4𝑃𝑃 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥
𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃∈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃
𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)� − 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)�   
s. t.: 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)� ≥  𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)� ∀ 𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃 ∈ ?̂?𝑆4𝑃𝑃   
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The constraint of the attitude function induces the proposer to offer only shares 
less or equal to 0.5. Hence, the proposer offers 0.5 if ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 > 0.5 and offers ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 if 
?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 ≤ 0.5. Envy, the negative attitude towards disadvantageous inequity, which 
has a strength of 𝛽𝛽5, plays a role only if 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 ≥ 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃. It is represented by:  
(23) 𝑎𝑎5𝑃𝑃 = −� 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)� − 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)��.  
Envy guides the decision only, if the proposer believes that it leads to the 
following action tendency: 
(24) ?̂?𝑠5𝑃𝑃 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃∈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃
 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)� − 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)� 
Let us assume the proposer thinks that the acceptance level of the responder 
exceeds 0.5, so that: ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 > 0.5.  From the proposer’s viewpoint the responder 
earns more than 0.5 if their offer is in accordance to ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛. But then:  
(25)  𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)� − 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)� > 0  
But if they offer less than ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 to the responder, then the responder rejects the 
offer and both receive nothing, so that: 
(26)  𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)� − 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)� = 0  
Hence, for ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 > 0.5, any offer ?̂?𝑠5𝑃𝑃 ≤ 0.5 results in an envy-free outcome. If 
?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = 0.5, offering 0.5 leads to an outcome which is envy-free, whereas both 
receive 0.5. But offering less also leads to an envy-free outcome, as both receive 
nothing. As the action tendency is a convex combination of the different attitude 
maximizing alternatives (?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗 = 1𝑛𝑛 ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 ), this implies that the action tendency is the 
convex combination of all numbers in the interval [0; ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛]  if ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = 0.5  and [0; ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛[ if ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 > 0.5 . Hence: 
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(27)  ?̂?𝑠5𝑃𝑃 = 1𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ∫ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚0   respectively  ?̂?𝑠5𝑃𝑃 = 0.5 ∙ ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 
If ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 < 0.5, envy does not play any role, so that 𝛽𝛽5 = 0. Altruism, the positive 
attitude towards the responder’s material payoff, is represented by:  
(28) 𝑎𝑎6𝑃𝑃 = 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)�  
and leads to the following set of attitude maximizing action tendencies: 
(20) ?̂?𝑆6𝑃𝑃 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥
𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃∈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃
𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅�𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃, ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)� 
Hence: ?̂?𝑆6𝑃𝑃 = {1}. Altruism pushes the proposer to the maximal offer 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚, which 
is 1, so  that  ?̂?𝑠6𝑃𝑃 = 1. Altruism has a strength of 𝛽𝛽6.  
The dissonance minimizing alternative 𝑠𝑠∗ , which has been defined as the 
alternative whose unit vector has minimal distance to the dissonance minimizing 
action tendency 𝜎𝜎∗ , depends on ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 . In the ultimatum game, the responder’s 
alternative space is continuous, so that 𝑠𝑠∗ = 𝜎𝜎∗. Hence, 𝑠𝑠∗ = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 . If ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 >0.5 , then: 𝑠𝑠∗ = 𝜎𝜎∗ = ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 ∙ 𝛽𝛽1 + (0.5 + 0.5 ∙ ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛) ∙ 𝛽𝛽2 + 0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽3 + 0,5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽4 +0.5 ∙ ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 ∙ 𝛽𝛽5 + 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ∙ 𝛽𝛽6. If ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 ≤ 0.5, then: 𝑠𝑠∗ = 𝜎𝜎∗ = ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 ∙ 𝛽𝛽1 + (0.5 + 0.5 ∙
?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛) ∙ 𝛽𝛽2 + 0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽3 + ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 ∙ 𝛽𝛽4 + 0.5 ∙ ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 ∙ 𝛽𝛽5 + 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ∙ 𝛽𝛽6. 
Now, we apply this outcome to the mini ultimatum game in order to explain the 
behavioral discontinuity of proposer behavior. 
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B. Explaining Behavioral Discontinuity of Proposer Behavior in the Mini 
Ultimatum Game  
We refer to three mini ultimatum game versions which Güth, Huck and Müller 
(1998) have used to show that proposer behavior changes, if the equal split is not 
available. The three games are shown in figure 2: 
 
 
FIGURE 2: THREE MINI ULTIMATUM GAMES (GÜTH, HUCK AND MÜLLER, 1998, 3). 
In the game “Equal,” the equal split is feasible whereas in the games “Prop” and 
“Resp” only nearly equal splits are feasible.  It turned out that fair offers (choosing 
strategy r) occurred less often when the equal split was not available. The fraction 
of proposers who chose the fair offer (strategy r) was largest in game “Equal”, 
second largest in game “Prop” and smallest in game “Resp.” That is, a small payoff 
change turned out to be capable of reversing the behavior of participants (Güth, 
Huck and Müller, 1998, 5). We can explain this behavioral pattern with our model. 
First, in Game “Prop” and game “Equal” envy does not play any role at all, 
because the responder cannot earn a higher outcome than the responder. Hence: 
(30) 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝛽𝛽5𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 𝛽𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 0. 
Second, in game “Prop” and in game “Resp,” the equal split is not feasible and 
thus the fulfillment of the norm of equal sharing is not possible. This means that 
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the proposer is forced to break the norm. Here, the theory of cognitive dissonance 
states that striving for consistency between behavior and attitudes induces a change 
of the attitude which is related to the broken norm. On the other hand the game 
“Equal” puts a decision maker’s focus directly on the norm of equal sharing, as 
there is only one other alternative available. Therefore, the positive attitude towards 
the norm of fair sharing plays a more important role in the Game “Equal.” Hence: 
(31) 𝛽𝛽3
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 > 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅.  
We denote the unfair strategy 𝑚𝑚 with �10� and the fair strategy r with �01�.  
First we consider behavioral discontinuities in games “Equal” and “Prop.” 𝜀𝜀 ∈]0,1[ denotes the change of attitude strength, so that: 𝜀𝜀 = 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 − 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. As for all 𝑖𝑖 =1,2,4,6 it holds that 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, we can write: 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, where 𝛿𝛿1 + 𝛿𝛿2 +
𝛿𝛿4 + 𝛿𝛿6 = 𝜀𝜀 and 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝜀𝜀]. In the games “Prop” and “Equal” the feasible offers, 
are 3
20
 and 9
20
 respectively 3
20
 and 10
20
 . This implies  ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 ≤  0.5.  
Proposition 2: 
If the proposer believes, that the responder accepts both, 𝑎𝑎 and 𝑚𝑚, and if for any 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝜀𝜀]  and 𝜀𝜀 ∈ ]0,1[ , it holds 𝜀𝜀 ≠ 𝛿𝛿6  and 0.5 − 0.5𝛿𝛿2 − 𝛿𝛿6 + 𝜀𝜀 > 0.5𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 +
𝛽𝛽3
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 > 0.5, then the proposer behaves discontinuous in games “Equal” and 
“Prop”. 
 Proof of Proposition 2 see Appendix. 
Proposition 2 states that discontinuity occurs either if the decision maker’s focus 
is shifted to an attitude which is quite strong or if the decision maker’s tendency 
towards fair behavior (strategy r) in the game “Equal” is not very strong. 
32 
 
Now, we consider the case in which the proposer believes that the responder 
accepts only the fair offer r. Here, we need to take into account that ?̂?𝑆4
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = {𝑚𝑚, 𝑎𝑎}, 
because if the unfair offer is rejected, this leads to the same outcome for both, 
namely 0. If the fair offer is accepted, this leads to the same outcome for both, 
namely 10. Therefore, both offers are equal in regard to spitefulness.   
Proposition 3:  
If the proposer believes that the responder accepts only the fair offer 𝑎𝑎 , no 
behavioral discontinuity occurs. The proposer chooses the fair offer in both the 
games “Equal” and “Prop.” 
Proof of Proposition 3 see Appendix. 
The intuition for this is as follows: The decision maker chooses the fair offer in 
the game “Equal.” In the game “Prop,” the unfair offer is rejected and leads to the 
same outcome for both. But the fair offer is accepted and leads to a larger outcome 
for the proposer. Hence, the fair outcome is compatible to spite. 
Now, we consider behavioral discontinuities in games “Prop” and game “Resp.” 
We have already stated that envy plays a role in the game “Resp,” but there is also 
a difference concerning spite.  
Let 𝜀𝜀 ∈ ]0; 1[  and  𝜀𝜀 = 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝛽𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 0. For all 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,3,4,6 it holds that 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ≤
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. We can write: 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,3,4,6, where 𝛿𝛿1 + 𝛿𝛿2 + 𝛿𝛿3 + 𝛿𝛿4 +
𝛿𝛿6 = 𝜀𝜀 and 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝜀𝜀] for all 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,3,4,6 
Proposition 4:  
If the proposer believes that the responder accepts both the fair offer 𝑎𝑎 and l, and 
if for any 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝜀𝜀] and 𝜀𝜀 ∈ ]0,1[, it holds ε > δ1 + 0.5δ2+δ4 and 0,5 > β1Pr +
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0.5 ∙ β2Pr + β4Pr > 0.5 + δ1 + 0.5δ2 + δ4 − ε , then the proposer behaves 
discontinuously in games “Prop” and “Resp.” 
Proof of proposition 4, see Appendix. 
Discontinuity between “Prop” and “Resp” occurs only if envy plays a role in the 
game “Resp.” Decision makers who do not have a negative attitude towards 
disadvantageous inequity do not change behavior across games. 
Proposition 5:  
If the proposer believes, that the responder accepts only the fair offer 𝑎𝑎, then the 
proposer chooses the fair offer in the game “prop” and the unfair offer in the game 
“Resp”, if: 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 0.5 ⟺ 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝛿𝛿4 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 0.5. 
Proof of proposition 5, see Appendix. 
Here, a proposer, whose attitude “spite” is very strong, chooses the fair offer in 
the game “Prop” because, from his point of view, the fair offer ensures that they 
will receive more than the responder and he believes that the unfair offer is being 
rejected. Spitefulness is not in conflict with fairness, because envy does not play 
any role in the game “Prop.” But in the game “Resp,” both spitefulness and envy 
influence the action tendency and thus behavior. Someone who is sufficiently 
spiteful and envious will chose the fair offer in the game “Prop” and the unfair offer 
in the game “Resp.” 
In this section, we have shown how our model can be used to explain how small 
payoff changes reverse fairness behavior of a decision maker. In the next section 
we draw some pertinent conclusions. 
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VI. Conclusions 
We have developed a decision model in which a decision maker’s driving force 
is minimizing the amount of experienced cognitive dissonance. We have based this 
model on Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance. The model is built on 
three core assumptions. First, attitudes lead to action tendencies. Second, 
competing attitudes can lead to competing action tendencies. Third, individuals 
seek to minimize cognitive dissonance by choosing the alternative which is closest 
to the dissonance minimizing action tendency. The dissonance minimizing action 
tendency is a cognitive compromise between the competing action tendencies, and 
this provides a useful reference point. By using the dissonance minimizing action 
tendency as reference point, a preference order over the alternatives can be 
determined. The shorter the distance of an alternative to this reference point, the 
higher this alternative is in rank. Hence, attitudes are the basis of preference orders. 
By showing this, the model states that in most cases people do not necessarily 
choose what they wish to choose. A pure payoff-maximizer who chooses an 
alternative in a continuous alternative space likes what he prefers, but a real person 
who bases the decisions to be taken on more than a single attitude is forced to make 
a compromise, especially if the alternative space is discrete. It can happen that 
people do not like what they prefer, because the best compromise is still a 
compromise. This is why people engage in the reduction of cognitive dissonance 
after they have carried out their choice.  
The model at hand takes into consideration that changes in the decision context 
can affect the set of triggered attitudes and the attitude strengths and thus the ideal 
cognitive compromise σ∗ . As we have seen in the discussion of the three mini 
ultimatum games, the context may shift the ideal cognitive compromise and hence 
may change the behavior s∗, but need not do so. People who have a very strong 
tendency towards a particular behavior are not affected by small shifts of σ∗. 
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A crucial factor in our model is the measurement of attitude strength. It is 
measurable on a magnitude scale (Kahneman et al, 1999, 222; Lodge, 1981, 42f). 
This scale is a ratio scale (Montello 1991, 104). A magnitude scale is characterized 
by a meaningful zero, and is able to express the ratios of the variable which are 
measured.  It is not interpersonally comparable as individuals differ in the 
assignment of numbers to stimuli. That is, some people generally assign low 
numbers, whereas others assign large numbers. (Kahneman et al, 1999, 222). An 
example for an attitude scale is the dollar scale. People assign sums of dollars to an 
attitude (Kahneman et al., 1999, 207). For a discussion of this scaling method, see 
for example Lodge (1981). 
Our model is an alternative approach to additive utility models of the Fehr-
Schmidt type. These models represent a preference order over multi-attributive 
alternatives by an overall utility function which is the weighted sum of sub-utility 
functions. Among others, the models differ with regard to the required scales. The 
additive utility model requires that the sub-utility functions are cardinally scaled, 
because otherwise, addition is not possible. Cardinal utility requires a bunch of 
assumptions on the choice behavior of the decision maker which are formulated as 
axioms of rationality. Our model does not use utility functions to represent 
preference order, and does not rely on rationality assumptions which contradict 
behaviors of real decision makers.  
By assuming that people are seeking an inner harmony, and therefore minimize 
cognitive dissonance, we have defined an idea of man that is rooted in psychology. 
This model can be used to explain why people act irrationally and inconsistently, 
ignore maximization principles and do not always show self-interest. Our model 
can be extended to a model of preference change by incorporating the process of 
post decisional dissonance reduction. This would be a profitable area for further 
research. 
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VII. Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
𝑍𝑍(𝜎𝜎) = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ ��?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗 − 𝜎𝜎�2�2𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1  ; ?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗 = �?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗1, … , ?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖, … , ?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚�𝑇𝑇 and 
𝜎𝜎 = (𝜎𝜎1, … ,𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖, … ,𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚)𝑇𝑇 
Hence:   
𝑍𝑍(𝜎𝜎) = �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ ��?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗 − 𝜎𝜎�2�2𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
⟺  𝑍𝑍(𝜎𝜎) = �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ ���?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 − 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖�2𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1
�
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
 
𝜕𝜕𝑍𝑍
𝜕𝜕𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
∗ = 0 ⟺�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ (−2) ∙ �?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 − 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖∗� = 0 𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
⟺ 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
∗ = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ ?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1
∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
 
⟺ 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
∗ = � 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗
∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘
𝐽𝐽
𝑘𝑘=1
∙ ?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
 
With ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘
𝐽𝐽
𝑘𝑘=1 = 1 it follows:   
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
∗ = �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ ?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
 
From σ∗ = (σ1∗ , … ,σi∗, … ,σm∗ )T and σi∗ = ∑ βj ∙ s�jiJj=1  for i = 1, … , n it follows:  
𝜎𝜎∗ = �∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ ?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗1𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 , … ,∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ ?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 , … ,∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ ?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 �𝑇𝑇  
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⟺ 𝜎𝜎∗ = 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ � ?̂?𝑠11⋮
?̂?𝑠1𝑚𝑚
� + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝐽𝐽 ∙ � ?̂?𝑠𝐽𝐽1⋮
?̂?𝑠𝐽𝐽𝑚𝑚
� 
⟺ 𝜎𝜎∗ = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ∙ ?̂?𝑠𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 .  
∎ 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
The Action tendency in the game “Equal” is: 
 𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸∗ = 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 �10� + 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 �0.5 ∙ �10� + 0.5 ∙ �01�� + 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 �01� + 𝛽𝛽4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 �10� + 𝛽𝛽6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 �01� 
Hence:   
𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
∗ = �𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸�.  
The Action tendency in the game “Prop” is: 
σPr
∗ = β1Pr �10� + β2Pr �0.5 ∙ �10� + 0.5 ∙ �01�� + β3Pr �01� + β4Pr �10� + β6Pr �01� 
Hence:  
𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
∗ = �𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�  
If 0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 > 0.5  the proposer chooses the fair strategy in the 
game “Equal”, that is 𝑠𝑠𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸∗ = �01�. If 0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 > 0.5 he chooses the 
fair strategy in the game “Prop”. If 0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 < 0.5  the proposer 
choses the unfair strategy in the game “Prop”, 𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃∗ = �10�. Hence the proposer 
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behaves discontinuous, if the following necessary and sufficient conditions are 
fulfilled.  
Necessary condition: 
(A1)  0.5 ∙ β2Eq + β3Eq + β6Eq > 0.5 ∙ β2Pr + β3Pr + β6Pr  
We insert 𝜀𝜀 = 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 − 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 for i = 1,2,4,6 and receive:  
(A2)  ε > 0.5 ∙ δ2 + δ6 
Except for δ6 = ε this inequality can hold.  
Sufficient Condition: 
(A3)  0.5𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 > 0.5  and 
(A4)  0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 < 0.5  
Insert 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 − 𝜀𝜀, 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛿𝛿2 = 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, and 𝛽𝛽6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛿𝛿6 = 𝛽𝛽6𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 into (A4): 
(A5)  0.5𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 < 0.5 − 0.5𝛿𝛿2 − 𝛿𝛿6 + 𝜀𝜀            
Note that: −0.5𝛿𝛿2 − 𝛿𝛿6 + 𝜀𝜀 > 0. From (A3) and (A5) it follows, that discontinuous 
behavior occurs, if: 
(A6) 0.5 − 0.5𝛿𝛿2 − 𝛿𝛿6 + 𝜀𝜀 > 0.5𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 > 0.5 
∎ 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
The Action tendency in the game “Prop” is: 𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 �01� + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 �01� +
𝛽𝛽3
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 �01� + 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 �01� + 𝛽𝛽6𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 �01� = �01�. The Action tendency in the game “Equal” is: 
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𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
∗ = 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 �01� + 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 �01� + 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 �01� + 𝛽𝛽4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 �0.5 �10� + 0.5 �01�� + 𝛽𝛽6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 �01� . 
Hence: 𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸∗ = � 0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝛽𝛽1
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸� . If 𝛽𝛽4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 < 1 , 𝑠𝑠𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸∗ = �01� . 
The decision maker choses the fair offer in the game “Equal”.  
∎ 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
The Action tendency in the game “Resp” is: 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗ = 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 �10� + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 �0.5 �10� +0.5 �01�� + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 �01� + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 �10� + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 �10� + 𝛽𝛽6𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 �01�.  Hence: 
𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
∗ = �𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 �.  
The Action tendency in the game “Prop” is: 
𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
∗ = 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 �10� + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 �0.5 �10� + 0.5 �01�� + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 �01� + 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 �10� + 𝛽𝛽6𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 �01� . 
Hence: 𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃∗ = �𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃� 
Necessary Condition: 
(A7)  𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 
Inserting 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,4  and 𝜀𝜀 = 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅  leads to: 
(A8)  𝜀𝜀 > 𝛿𝛿1 + 0.5𝛿𝛿2+𝛿𝛿4 
This condition is fulfilled. 
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Sufficient Condition: 
(A9)  𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 0.5 (I) 
and 
(A10)  𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 < 0.5 (II) 
Inser: 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,4  and 𝜀𝜀 = 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 into (I): 
 (A11)  𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 > 0.5 + 𝛿𝛿1 + 0.5𝛿𝛿2 + 𝛿𝛿4 − 𝜀𝜀  
The right side of (A11) is strictly less than 0.5 if the necessary condition is fulfilled. 
It follows: 
(A12)   0,5 > 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 0.5 ∙ 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 > 0.5 + 𝛿𝛿1 + 0.5𝛿𝛿2 + 𝛿𝛿4 − 𝜀𝜀  
 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
The Action tendency in the game “Resp” is:  𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗ = 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 �01� + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 �01� +
𝛽𝛽3
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 �01� + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 �10� + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 �10� + 𝛽𝛽6𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 �01� 
Hence: 
𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
∗ = � 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝛽𝛽1
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅� 
The action tendency in the game “Prop” is: 
𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
∗ = �01� 
The decision maker choses the fair offer in the game “prop” and the unfair offer in 
the game “Resp”, if: 
𝛽𝛽4
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 0.5 ⟺ 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝛿𝛿4 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 0.5 
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